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PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: A NECESSARY TENSION
[N]o other tort has received such an outpouring of comment in
advocacy of its bare existence.1
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been observed that "[tihe intensity and complexity of life, at-
tendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some re-
treat from the world, and man ... has become more sensitive to
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the
individual." 2 In other words, the right of privacy becomes more neces-
sary as technology advances. 3 This insight led Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis to propose the invasion of privacy cause of action in a landmark
law review article they wrote in 1890.' Since that time, the right of pri-
vacy has been recognized by virtually every state.5
Privacy tort law encompasses four separate causes of action.6 The
first form to be recognized by the courts involves the appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's benefit or advantage.7 An-
other form which has been generally recognized involves an intrusion
upon the plaintiffs physical solitude or seclusion.' The third form of a
tortious invasion of privacy consists of publicity which places the plaintiff
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, 802-03 (4th ed. 1971).
2. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890).
3. See, eg., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 533, 483 P.2d 34, 37,
93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1971); and Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Dignity: an Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 962 (1964): "analysis of the interest involved in the privacy
cases is of utmost significance because in our own day scientific and technological advances
have raised the spectre of new and frightening invasions of privacy." Id. at 963.
4. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2.
5. William Prosser states that "[iun one form or another, the right of privacy is by this
time recognized and accepted in all but a very few jurisdictions." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, 804 (4th ed. 1971). Furthermore, he notes that the Supreme Court
has suggested that the decisions in four states denying recognition of the right are to be over-
ruled. Id. at 816. This suggestion is based on the applicability of the more recently recognized
constitutional right of privacy, see infra pp. 6-10, to tort liability.
For a thorough account of the development of privacy tort law see, Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960).
6. For a discussion of the assertion that privacy consists of a single tort, see Bloustein,
supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)
(plaintiff's picture used to advertise flour).
8. See, eg., Young v. Western & A.R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929) (search
of plaintiff's home without a warrant).
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in a false light in the public eye.' The fourth form, which is the focus of
this Comment, involves the public disclosure of private facts.10 This lat-
ter form of privacy invasion comes into direct conflict with first amend-
ment guarantees, particularly the free speech and free press provisions.1I
The United States Supreme Court first dealt with this conflict in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn. 2 However, the Court's narrow holding in
that case left open the question of whether the press can ever be penal-
ized for printing the truth.13 Accordingly, the continued vitality of the
public disclosure of private facts tort remains uncertain.
14
The thesis of this Comment is that the fundamental nature of the
right of privacy compels the conclusion that the public disclosure of pri-
vate facts cause of action will remain a viable tort. It is further suggested
that the Supreme Court adopt a balancing approach in this area to ac-
comodate the individual's interest in privacy and society's interest in the
free flow of information. Such an approach not only is consistent with
developments in the lower courts, but also is supported by Supreme
Court cases dealing with various aspects of the right of privacy.
II. THE TENSION
A. The Firstness of the First Amendment
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,1" Justice Douglas stated that the first
9. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (honest taxi driver's
face used in article on cheating propensities of taxi drivers).
Although there has been much overlapping of defamation in false light privacy cases, the
privacy cases go considerably beyond the narrow limits of defamation, and have the potential
to engulf the entire law of defamation. Prosser, supra note 5, at 400-01.
For a complete discussion comparing defamation and privacy in a first amendment con-
text, see Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205
(1976).
10. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (movie about plaintiff's
past life as a prostitute).
Like defamation, the interest protected by this tort is that of reputation. However, there
is a significant difference between the two in that truth is not a defense to the privacy tort.
Prosser, Privacy, supra note 5, at 398.
11. Although the focus of this Comment is on the conflict between privacy and freedom of
the press, much of the analysis is also applicable to the conflict between privacy and freedom of
speech.
12. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
13. Although the Court stated that the broader question is "whether truthful publications
may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments," id. at 491, it must be recognized that the Court was only speaking in the con-
text of privacy analysis. For instance, the press obviously cannot print truthful matters that
would jeopardize national security.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
15. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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amendment is in a "preferred position."16 Numerous Supreme Court Jus-
tices and commentators have agreed with this notion of the "firstness of
the first amendment."17 As a result, courts give great weight to a defense
based upon the first amendment, and cast a scrutinizing eye upon any
claim that may have a detrimental effect on the interests sought to be
protected by the first amendment.
Notwithstanding this deference, the first amendment is by no means
an absolute defense. Public policy and individual rights have been fur-
thered in certain situations despite their limiting effect upon the first
amendment." Thus, the question arises as to whether a person's right
not to have private facts about his or her life published is such an impor-
tant interest as to at least require some sort of balancing approach, or
whether it is one of those claims that must yield to the firstness of the
first amendment in all instances.
B. The Supreme Court Speaks
The conflict between privacy and the first amendment has been rec-
ognized for many years. 9 Until recently, however, the issue was rarely
raised in constitutional terms.2" In 1975, the issue was explicitly raised
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.2" In Cox, the identity of a deceased
rape victim was obtained by a reporter from court records and was subse-
quently broadcasted by the media. The victim's father sued the newsman
and the television station for invasion of privacy, basing his cause of ac-
tion on a Georgia criminal statute22 making it a misdemeanor to publish
or broadcast the identity of a rape victim. The Georgia Supreme Court,
16. Id. at 115. For criticism of the concept of the first amendment as a "preferred" free-
dom, see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-96
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. For example, Justice Cardozo has noted that "one may say that [freedom of speech] is
the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
18. For a brief survey of relatively recent cutbacks on the primacy of the first amendment,
see Goldberg, The First Amendment and Its Protections, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 5-6
(1980).
19. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis theorized that the privacy right did not extend to prohi-
bition of "matter which is of public or general interest." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at
214.
20. Although it has been stated that as of 1973 the first amendment defense had not been
raised in a public disclosure case, Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462,
1469 n.36 (1973), at least one earlier case discusses the press' first amendment rights. Barber
v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942). Prior to Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), however, nearly all cases focused on the press' protection under
state law rather than under the first amendment.
21. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
22. GA. CODE § 16-6-23 (1968) (amended 1982). The statute states in pertinent part:
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relying on the statute as a declaration that the identity of a rape victim
was not a matter of public concern, held that the statute was constitu-
tional as a legitimate limitation on the right of freedom of expression
contained in the first amendment.23
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state may
not impose sanctions on those who accurately publish such informa-
tion.24 However, upon recognizing the conflict between the right of pri-
vacy and the first amendment,2" the Court carefully limited its holding to
the particular facts presented. It stated:
Rather than address the broader question whether truthful
publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,...
it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface between
press and privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the
State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the
name of a rape victim obtained from public records-more spe-
cifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connec-
tion with a public prosecution and which themselves are open
to public inspection.26
The Supreme Court's failure to answer the broader question
presented in Cox has left the public disclosure aspect of privacy tort law
in a state of limbo. The cause of action is codified in section 652D of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.27 However, the section concludes with a
(a) It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and
publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium. . . the name
or identity of any female who may have been raped ....
(c) Any person or corporation violating this Code section shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
23. Cox Broadcasting Corp. V. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973), rev'd, 420 U.S.
469 (1975).
24. 420 U.S. at 491.
25. Id. at 489. The Court stated: "Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the
publication of information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or
otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the
constitutional freedoms of speech and press." Id.
26. Id. at 491.
27. The section reads as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind
that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976). A preliminary note in a tentative draft of
§ 652D states that § 652D was amended to add subsection (b) as a result of the Cox case.
RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
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special note stating that "[i]t has not been established with certainty that
liability of this nature is consistent with the free-speech and free-press
provisions of the First Amendment."28 As noted by the Ninth Circuit,
the Cox Court's failure to answer the broader question means that there
is still an issue as to whether the public disclosure tort is "to be written
out of the law."29 Thus, the continued vitality of liability claims for pub-
lic disclosure invasions of privacy appears questionable, pending further
elucidation by the United States Supreme Court.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Although the Supreme Court has declined to answer the question of
whether public disclosure actions may ever withstand first amendment
defenses, the fundamental nature of the right of privacy30 compels the
conclusion that the question should be answered affirmatively.
A. Defining the Interest
It has been stated that "privacy is not given the recognition it de-
serves as a fundamental value simply because the concept is so difficult to
formulate or justify in nonsubjective terms."31 Even so, privacy has been
defined as encompassing specific individual and societal interests.
Various writers have identified a number of ways that privacy fur-
thers an individual's interests.32 These include protecting the individ-
ual's public image, nurturing individuality, permitting emotional release
and promoting human relationships.33 Privacy also serves the more gen-
eral, societal function of furthering democracy.34 It does so by drawing a
line between the individual and the collective-between self and society.
This line allows the development of independent minded citizens, and
consequently, fosters "a firmer, better constructed, and more integrated
position in opposition to the dominant social pressures. ' 35
B. Public Disclosure and the Constitutional Right of Privacy
Developments in constitutional law which raise the right of privacy
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
29. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975).
30. See infra note 39.
31. Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GONz. L. REV. 587, 588 (1977).
32. See, e.g., id. at 589-91; A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-39 (1967).
33. Bazelon, supra note 31, at 589-91.
34. Id. at 591-94.
35. Simmel, Privacy is not an Isolated Freedom, in PRIVACY, NoMos XIII 73 (1971). See
also, Bazelon, supra note 31, at 592.
1985]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18
"to the level of a constitutional rule" 36 provide further evidence of the
fundamental nature of the right of privacy. Arguably, the Court's recog-
nition of a general constitutional right of privacy elevates the tension to
one of constitutional right versus constitutional right.37 However, it is
far from clear to what extent the constitutional right of privacy overlaps
the tort right of privacy.
1. Emergence of the right
It is somewhat peculiar that our Founding Fathers did not mention
the right of privacy in the Constitution.38 Possibly, they felt that such a
right is so fundamental to a democratic society39 that mentioning it
would be meaningless or redundant." Or, more likely, they were simply
unaware of the potential for the sophisticated and massive means of com-
munication and information gathering which we have today, and there-
fore, did not realize the importance of such a right.
Although the absence of an express right of privacy in our Constitu-
tion made it difficult for the Supreme Court to recognize such a right,
this obstacle was overcome in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecti-
36. See infra text accompanying note 47.
37. It is somewhat ironic that the roots of the right of privacy have been found in the same
constitutional provision it conflicts with, namely, the first amendment. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
38. It is worth noting that some states have incorporated the right of privacy in their state
constitutions. See, eg., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
39. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Olmstead
v. United States, where Justice Brandeis characterized "the right to be let alone. . ." as "the
right most valued by civilized men." 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); and
Time, Inc. v. Hill, where Justice Fortas stated "[t]here are great and important values in our
society, none of which is greater than those reflected in the First Amendment, but which are
also fundamental and entitled to this Court's careful respect and protection. Among these is
the right to privacy. . . ." 385 U.S. 374, 412 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Even the Cox
Court noted the significance of privacy in a democratic society when it stated that "the inter-
ests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society."
420 U.S. at 491.
40. The Supreme Court used similar reasoning in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966), to explain why the right to travel was not mentioned in the Constitution. " Tihat
right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason [may be] that a right so elemen-
tary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the. . . Union the
Constitution created." Id. at 758. See also Z. CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONsTrrunON OF 1787 at 185 (1956):
Two diametrically opposite interpretations are possible when an important pro-
vision in a document is deliberately omitted by the draftsmen of a. . . document.
First, they left it out in order to get rid of it as objectionable. Second, they wanted to
keep the provision operative, but considered that its substance was already embodied
elsewhere and left it out as superfluous.
Another fundamental constitutional right not mentioned in the Constitution is the right
to vote in state elections. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS
cut.4 1 There, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that forbade
both the use of contraceptives and the aiding and abetting of such use.
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."'42 The first, third,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments to the Constitution, he wrote, con-
tain "[v]arious guarantees [that] create zones of privacy," and the right
to privacy in the marriage relationship lies within one of these zones.4 3
Justice Douglas concluded that the state statute at issue violated the right
of marital privacy and thus was unconstitutional.'
Arguably, the Court's recognition of a constitutional right of pri-
vacy in Griswold makes it practically impossible for the Supreme Court
to abolish the public disclosure cause of action. In other words, if the
public disclosure aspect of privacy has achieved constitutional dimen-
sion, it may not be taken away by anything short of a constitutional
amendment. However, it has not yet been settled whether the Supreme
Court has given the public disclosure aspect of privacy constitutional
stature.45 Nonetheless, language in Griswold and post-Griswold cases
provides strong evidence that it has already done so.
2. Nondisclosural privacy
Referring to the Court's recognition of a constitutional right of pri-
vacy in Griswold, Justice Black pointed out that the Court was "exalting
a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort
relief, to the level of a constitutional rule."4 6 Thus, arguably the Court
recognized the constitutional right of nondisclosural privacy47 as early as
Griswold, since the central thesis of the article referred to by Justice
Black was based on nondisclosural privacy."
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a sample of the scholarly analysis that followed Griswold, see
Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64
MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
42. 381 U.S. at 484.
43. Id. at 484-85.
44. Id. at 485.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
47. Various commentators and lower courts have used the term "nondisclosural privacy"
when discussing constitutional recognition of a person's right not to have private matters pub-
lished or disseminated. Therefore, the same term will be used throughout this section as a
synonym for public disclosure of "private facts" privacy.
48. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court stated that "the central thesis of the. ..
article by Warren and Brandeis. . .was that the press was overstepping its prerogatives by
1985]
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In Whalen v. Roe,4 9 the Supreme Court provided direct evidence of
a recognition of nondisclosural privacy5" when it stated the following:
"The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the in-
terest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."5"
Toward the end of the opinion, however, the Court confused things by
disclaiming recognition of at least one specific instance of privacy.52 In
its "final word about issues we have not decided," the Court stated that it
did not decide any constitutional questions that might be presented by
unwarranted disclosure of information in government computer banks. 3
Notwithstanding this, it is difficult to conclude that this narrow
statement disclaims the Court's suggestion of a broad right of nondis-
closural privacy earlier in its opinion. 4 Justice Brennan came to a simi-
lar conclusion in his concurring opinion,55 stating that "[t]he Court
recognizes that an individual's 'interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters' is an aspect of the right of privacy, . . . but holds that in this
case, any such interest has not been seriously enough invaded by the
State."
56
Although a majority of the federal courts interpret Whalen as recog-
nizing a constitutional right to nondisclosure,57 the Sixth Circuit came to
a contrary conclusion in J.P. v. DeSanti.8 In that case, a group of
juveniles sought to enjoin compilation and dissemination of their "social
histories."59 After concluding Whalen "does not . . . create a general
publishing essentially private information and that there should be a remedy for the alleged
abuses." 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975).
See also, Prossersupra, note 5, at 392: "[ihe article of Warren and Brandeis was primar-
ily concerned with the. . . public disclosure of embarrassing private facts [cause of action]
." Dean Prosser notes that the article was prompted as a result of the press prying into
the social affairs of Mr. Warren's family. Id. at 383.
49. 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (state recordation of identity of people who obtain certain drugs
does not violate right of privacy).
50. For a similar conclusion see Note, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Per-
sonal Matter: Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 71 GEO. L.J. 219 (1982), and
Comment, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 536,
541 (1982).
51. 429 U.S. at 599-600 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 605-06.
53. Id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
55. 429 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion, 429 U.S. at 599).
57. Note, supra note 50, at 231.
58. 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981).
59. Probation officers of the Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County in Ohio customarily con-
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constitutional right of nondisclosure,"'  the court reversed the district
court's grant of an injunction.6 However, the court expressly stated that
"[our] opinion does not mean that. . . there is no constitutional right to
nondisclosure of private information." 62 Thus, even the Sixth Circuit
hesitates to deny the existence of a limited constitutional right of nondis-
closural privacy.
Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
position in Whalen in a subsequent case. In Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,6" former President Nixon claimed a violation of his
constitutional privacy rights due to an act of Congress" directing that
the General Services Administrator take custody of Nixon's presidential
tapes and papers.6" During the course of its discussion of the privacy
claim, the Court repeated the nondisclosure language from Whalen by
stating that "[o]ne element of privacy has been characterized as 'the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.' "66 The Court
went on to state that although it agreed that even the President "[is] not
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights. . . any intrusion
must be weighed against the public interest."67
As the foregoing suggests, it appears that the Supreme Court has
recognized a constitutional right of nondisclosure. What is even clearer
is the growing importance of nondisclosural privacy in America, both as
a constitutional right and as a common law right. However, the Supreme
Court has refused to set up a framework for vindicating this right when it
clashes with the first amendment.
pile histories of those brought before the court. The histories contain information from the
complaining parties, the juveniles themselves, their past records in the court, their parents and
school records. They also include any information on record pertaining to other members of
the family and any other information that the probation officer feels is relevant. Written con-
sent from the juveniles or their families is not a prerequisite to compilation of the information
and access to the records is not available to the juveniles or their families.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1091.
62. Id. at 1090.
63. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
64. See Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982).
65. 433 U.S. at 455.
66. Id. at 457 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
67. Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added).
19851
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IV. TOWARD A BALANCING APPROACH
A. Supreme Court Treatment
1. Matter of public concern
The facts in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn68 appeared to present a
paradigm for privacy recovery. There are few facts more personal to an
individual than the fact that one has been raped. Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the identity of a rape victim has any news value.69 Yet,
the Cox Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit
states from penalizing the press for printing such information when it is
otherwise available to the public as part of a public record.7 0 Thus, one
might be tempted to conclude that the public disclosure cause of action
never can survive a first amendment defense. However, the rationale in
Cox compels a different conclusion.
By shifting its focus away from the intrinsic nature of the informa-
tion, 7 and basing its holding on the fact that the information was part of
a judicial record, the Court created a clear exception to privacy recov-
ery.7 2 The Court noted that "[w]ith respect to judicial proceedings...
the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to
bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administra-
tion of justice. '73 Therefore, "judicial proceedings . . . are without
question events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall
within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of govern-
ment."74 As of this writing, the position of the Supreme Court has not
changed in this regard since it rendered its opinion in Cox. If a certain
item can be deemed a "mater of public concern" there appears to be a
68. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
69. The fact that a person has been raped arguably has news value because it is something
society must be aware of in order to protect itself. However, broadcasting the identity of the
victim does not provide society with any additional useful information, especially when bal-
anced against the possible adverse effects publishing such information may have on victims and
their relatives. Although possibly more news is sold when such information is included, it is
difficult to imagine the Court will ever allow the concept of "value" to be reduced to dollars
and cents accruing to a particular business.
70. 420 U.S. at 491, 497.
71. Although the Court characterized the information as "part of a judicial record," it
could have just as easily characterized it as "the specific identity of a rape victim." However,
had it done this, it would have been extremely difficult to justify printing such information as
being a matter of public concern. Stated differently, the Court is able to justify the printing of
certain information, depending on how it initially characterizes that information.
72. Woito and McNulty, The Privacy Disclosure Tort and the First Amendment: Should
the Community Decide Newsworthiness? 64 IowA L. REv. 185, 232 (1979).
73. 420 U.S. at 492 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
74. Id.
[Vol. 18
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constitutionally based defense to public disclosure recovery.75
The Cox Court's rationale for its holding implies a willingness to
penalize the press for truthful publications that are not matters of public
concern. Indeed, the Court encouraged the states to fashion appropriate
laws to meet privacy interests such as those raised by the facts in Cox.
76
It directed the states that
[i]f there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial pro-
ceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public
documentation or other exposure of private information. Their
political institutions must weigh the interests in privacy with
the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish.
7
Furthermore, instead of striking down the Georgia statute on which
the plaintiffs in Cox relied,78 the Court merely held that it was not appli-
cable where the private information it seeks to protect is part of a judicial
record.79
To summarize, by creating a "matter of public concern" exception
to privacy recovery, the Supreme Court has essentially admitted that
there are instances where the press can be penalized for printing the
truth. However, simply stating what is not considered private matter
gives very little guidance to the lower courts. Nonetheless, the Court's
earlier discussions about newsworthiness indicate it is willing to develop
a more comprehensive framework for dealing with the tension between
the right of privacy and the first amendment.
2. Newsworthiness
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized "newsworthiness" as a
prerequisite to the first amendment defense almost a decade before Cox
in Time, Inc. v. Hill.80 In that case, Hill and his family were held hostage
in their home by three escaped convicts and were ultimately released un-
harmed. Plaintiff Hill expressly stated to newsmen that there had been
no violence and that nobody was molested. A novel about a hostage
incident depicting considerable violence appeared later, and was subse-
quently made into a play. In the "fictionalized" version of the incident
"the father and son are beaten and the daughter [is] subjected to a verbal
75. However, it is worth noting that in a later case the Court uses the language "matter of
public significance" to describe its holding in Cox. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759
n.10 (1982) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
76. 420 U.S. at 496.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 22.
79. 420 U.S. at 491.
80. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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sexual insult.""1 The defendant published an account of the play, relat-
ing it to the Hill incident by describing the play as a re-enactment and
using photographs of scenes staged in the former Hill home as
illustrations.
Alleging the article gave a knowingly false impression that the play
depicted the actual incident, Hill sued for damages under a New York
statute which provided a cause of action where an individual's name or
picture is used by another without consent for purposes of trade or ad-
vertising. 2 Anticipating a clash between the statutory right of privacy
and first amendment rights, the Court requested counsel to discuss the
following questions on reargument:
(1) Is the truthful presentation of a newsworthy item ever ac-
tionable under the New York statute. . . ? If so, does appel-
lant have standing to challenge that aspect of the statute?
(2) Should the per curiam opinion of the New York Court of
Appeals be read as adopting the following portion of the con-
curring opinion in the Appellate Division?
"However, if it can be clearly demonstrated that the
newsworthy item is presented, not for the purpose of dissemi-
nating news, but rather for the sole purpose of increasing circu-
lation, then the rationale for exemption from section 51 no
longer exists. . . . In such circumstances the privilege to use
one's name should not be granted even though a true account
of the event be given-let alone when the account is sensation-
alized and fictionalized.
'8 3
Justice Keating's opinion in Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,84 an-
swered these questions prior to reargument. The Hill Court stated that
the opinion in Spahn made it "crystal clear" that "truth is a complete
defense in actions under the statute based upon reports of newsworthy
people or eyents." a The Court then proceeded to state that "[t]his limi-
tation to ndwsworthy persons and events does not of course foreclose an
interpretation of the statute to allow damages where '[r]evelations may
be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to
81. Id. at 378.
82. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976). Although the text of the
statute appears to proscribe relief only in appropriation cases, the Hill Court noted that "[t]he
New York courts have. . . construed the statute to operate much more broadly." 385 U.S. at
381.
83. 385 U.S. at 382-83 n.6 (quoting 384 U.S. 995 (1966) (order for reargument)).
84. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966).
85. 385 U.S. at 383.
[Vol. 18
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS
outrage the community's notions of decency.' ,86
The foregoing suggests an attempt by the Supreme Court to limit
the press to publicizing only newsworthy matters, more precisely, news-
worthy matters that are not outrageous. However, the Court subse-
quently avoided any discussion of newsworthiness in Cox, and developed
the ad hoc exception of "matter of public concern."" Whether news-
worthiness encompasses the "matter of public concern" exception re-
mains to be seen. What is clear, though, is that it is time for the Supreme
Court to develop a more comprehensive guideline for weighing individu-
als' privacy rights against the press' first amendment rights.
B. Circuit Court Decisions
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted a balancing
approach to address the conflict, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
taken the initiative by using language from Cox. They have concluded
that "newsworthiness" is equivalent to the "matter of public concern"
exception created in Cox.
In Virgil v. Time, Inc.,"8 plaintiff Virgil asked not to be mentioned in
an article on body surfing when he found out that certain information
about his nonsurfing life was going to be published. 9 Despite his objec-
tions, the information was published and he subsequently brought suit
claiming a violation of his right of privacy.
Recognizing that the Supreme Court "refused to reach [the] broad
question 'whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or
criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments,' "0 the Ninth Circuit proceeded to rephrase the issue as whether
the tortious violation of privacy should be written out of the law.91 Con-
86. Id. at n.7 (emphasis added) (quoting Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d
Cir. 1940)).
87. See supra text accompanying note 26.
88. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
89. The following excerpts appeared in the article:
Virgil's carefree style at the Wedge appears to have emanated from some esca-
pades in his younger days, such as the time at a party when a young lady approached
him and asked where she might find an ashtray. 'Why, my dear, right here,' said
Virgil, taking her lighted cigarette and extinguishing it in his mouth ...
... . I quit my job, left home and moved to Mammoth Mountain. At the ski
lodge there one night I dove headfirst down a fight of stairs-just because. Because
why? Well, there were these chicks around. I thought it would be groovy. ....
Cherilee [plaintiff's wife] says, 'Mike also eats spiders and other insects and things.'
Id. at 1124 n.1 (quoting Kirkpatrick, The Closest Thing to Being Born, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Feb. 22, 1971).
90. Id. at 1127 (quoting Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)).
91. 527 F.2d at 1127.
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cluding that it should not, the Virgil court held that publishing private
facts is not protected by the first amendment, absent the privilege of
newsworthiness.92
The court reasoned that allowing the first amendment privilege to
extend to all true statements "would seem to deny the existence of 'pri-
vate' facts." 93 In other words, "[t]he extent to which areas of privacy
[would] continue to exist .. .would .. .be based not on rights be-
stowed by law but on the taste and discretion of the press."
'94
The standard of newsworthiness adopted by the Virgil court is based
on the "of legitimate concern to the public" language in section 652D of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.95 Thus, the Ninth Circuit appears to
equate the term "newsworthy" with the phrase "matter of public
concern."
96
The Virgil court additionally stated that whether the public has an
interest in knowing private facts about a person who engages in body
surfing presented factual questions regarding the state of community mo-
res.97 Because it concluded that such questions were not properly con-
sidered by the district court, the case was remanded. 98
The Tenth Circuit subsequently adopted a similar definition of
"newsworthy" in public disclosure privacy cases. In Gilbert v. Medical
Economics Co., 99 a physician brought suit against the publisher of an
92. Id. at 1128.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1129.- The court quoted the following language from comment f of the Restat-
ment as determining the scope of the privilege:
In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account must be taken
of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last analysis what is
proper becomes a matter of the community mores. The line is to be drawn when the
publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and
becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he
had no concern.
Id.
96. It has been suggested that the privilege to publish matter which is of public interest is
less expansive than the privlilege to publish anything that is newsworthy. See Comment, The
Right of Privacy. Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U.
CHi. L. Rnv. 722, 724 (1966).
97. 527 F.2d at 1131. The court stated:
Among the questions presented here are: Whether (and, if so, to what extent),
private facts respecting Virgil, as a prominent member of the group engaging in body
surfing at the Wedge, are matters in which the public has a legitimate interest; [and]
whether the identity of Virgil as the one to whom such facts apply is matter in which
the public has a legitimate interest.
Id. (footnote omitted).
98. Id.
99. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
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article, claiming that publication of her personal problems and incidents
of malpractice constituted a tortious invasion of her privacy. Although
the plaintiff ultimately was denied recovery, the Gilbert court nonetheless
noted that "the right of the individual to keep information private must
be balanced against the right of the press."1" The court relied on lan-
guage from the comments to section 652D and stated that "it is clear
• . .that the first amendment protects the publication of private facts
that are 'newsworthy,' that is, of legitimate concern to the public." 101
C. The California Approach
The California Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test to de-
termine whether published matter is newsworthy. In Briscoe v. Reader's
Digest Association,"2 the Reader's Digest Association published an arti-
cle which disclosed that Mr. Briscoe had once hijacked a truck. As a
result of the publication, Mr. Briscoe's eleven year old daughter and his
friends learned about the incident for the first time. Thereafter, they
scorned and abandoned him.
Mr. Briscoe sued the publisher, claiming it had invaded his right of
privacy by disclosing embarrassing private facts about his past life.
10 3
After acknowledging that newsworthy matter is constitutionally pro-
tected, the court stated that in determining whether printed matter is
newsworthy, "[w]e consider '[1] the social value of the facts published,
[2] the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and
[3] the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of
public notoriety.' "104
The California Supreme Court held that a jury could reasonably find
that the plaintiff's identity as a former highjacker was not newsworthy,
10 5
and consequently, remanded the case to the trial court.10 6 Applying the
three-part test, the court first concluded that a jury could find the pub-
lished incident was of minimal social value, since the legal proceedings
had terminated and Mr. Briscoe had reverted to a lawful lifestyle.1 07
100. Id. at 307.
101. Id. at 308 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967)).
102. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
103. The article was published approximately 11 years after the highjacking incident, but
nothing in the article indicated how long ago the incident occurred. Id. at 532, 483 P.2d at 36,
93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
104. Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875 (quoting Kappellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal.
3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d 912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1969)).
105. Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
106. Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
107. Id. at 541-42, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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Next the court stated that a jury may find that revealing a person's crimi-
nal past for all to see is grossly offensive to most people, due to the poten-
tially harmful consequences of such a revelation.' 8 Finally, the court
held that the plaintiff did not voluntarily consent to the publicity which
he received.109
As the foregoing demonstrates, various lower courts have developed
and refined their own balancing approaches to deal with the tension be-
tween privacy and the press. Yet, due to the Supreme Court's failure to
weigh these competing interests, the validity of lower court approaches
remains unsettled.
V. CONCLUSION
The importance of a free press and free speech in American has been
recognized from the beginning of our democracy, whereas the impor-
tance of privacy rights was not recognized until much later. Nonethe-
less, the importance of privacy rights continues to grow as technology
advances. Urbanization coupled with innovations in communication and
information-seeking devices elevates the right to be let alone to the level
of necessity.
Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court has refused to expressly
answer the question of whether the press may ever be penalized for dis-
closing highly private facts about an individual. In doing so, the Court
arguably answered the question affirmatively by implying that only mat-
ters of public concern are constitutionally protected. Even so, whether
the public disclosure aspect of privacy will continue to have meaning still
remains an open question.
It cannot be denied that a direct conflict between the right of pri-
vacy and the first amendment exists. However, eliminating the tension
will not solve the problem. Rather, what is needed is a balancing ap-
proach that takes into consideration the opposing rights and interests.
These fundamental rights create a tension that is necessary to our
form of government, much in the same way that the tension created by
the opposing ends of the violin string is necessary for that instrument to
play beautiful music. Must we be reminded that if one of the forces be-
comes nonexistent the music stops altogether?
Mark Schadrack
108. Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The court emphasized the resultant
ostracism, isolation and alienation of Mr. Briscoe's family in this case. Id., 483 P.2d at 43, 93
Cal. Rptr. at 875.
109. Id., 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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